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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
made errors in 
summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief First, he contends that 
proved his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a timely motion to suppress, 
which precluded him from moving to suppress statements Mr. Mallory made during an 
interrogation after several unequivocal requests for counsel (the "Fifth Amendment" 
claim). Second, Mr. Mallory contends he raised a genuine issue of material fact that the 
district court deprived him of his constitutional right to due process by denying him 
timely access to a private investigator, since doing so denied him access to the 
materials of a defense - namely, access to a critical witness and potential alternate 
perpetrator (the "private investigator" claim) Third, Mr. Mallory he raised a genuine 
issue of material fact that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not fully 
litigating issues surrounding the improper presentation of evidence about scratch marks 
on his body, as those scratch marks were not received until after the relevant events 
(the "scratch mark" claim). 
The State concedes that the district court improperly dismissed the private 
investigator claim by dismissing it on a basis for which Mr. Mallory did not have notice or 
opportunity to respond. The State does raises arguments in regard to some, but not all 
of the aspects of Mr. Mallory's arguments on appeal. However, the issues upon which it 
has remained silent actually undermine most of the arguments it did make. 
1 
Ultimately, none of the State's arguments are persuasive, and so, this Court 
should reverse the district court's orders denying and dismissing Mr. Mallory's claims in 
his petition for post-conviction relief and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Mallory's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court erred, following an evidentiary hearing, when it denied 
Mr. Mallory's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely and 
effectively argue the motion to suppress the video of his interrogation. 
2. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim 
that his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection were violated 
when the district court failed to timely rule on his motion to appoint a private 
investigator. 
3. Whether the district court erred when it summarily dismissed Mr. Mallory's claim 
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to '·fully litigate" a challenge to 
evidence and testimony regarding the nature of the scratch marks on his person. 
3 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred, Following An Evidentiary Hearing, When It Denied 
Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Timely And 
Effectively Argue The Motion To Suppress The Video Of His Interrogation 
In regard to Mr. Mallory's Fifth Amendment claim, the State offers no rebuttal to 
Mr. Mallory's argument that trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring the district 
court actually watched the video of the interrogation (see App. Br., pp.24-25), nor does 
it challenge his assertion that the statement "Get a lawyer, call my mom and dad, 
[expletive deleted] that drink of water, put me in jail. That's it." (State's Exhibit 15, 
1: 15:30) constituted the first of many unequivocal requests for counsel made by 
ML Mallory during the interrogation (see App. Br., pp.16-23.) 
Instead, the State argues that the timeliness of the motion to suppress is not 
properly considered in these post-conviction proceedings, and so, it claims there is no 
evidence rebutting the presumption that trial counsel's actions vis-a-vis the motion to 
suppress were strategic. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.) Similarly, it contends that Mr. Mallory 
did not sufficiently prove the prejudice caused him by counsel's failure to provide 
adequate representation in presenting the motion to suppress. (See generally Resp. 
Br., pp.16-21.) The State is incorrect on both counts. 
A The Timeliness Of The Motion To Suppress Is A Relevant Consideration In The 
Fifth Amendment Claim 
Mr. Mallory's allegation was that his attorney "provided ineffective assistance of 
counsel by not fully litigating and presenting to the District Court evidence of statements 
made by the defendant during police interrogation should be suppressed in violation of 
4 
petitioner's Sixth Amendment Rights.''1 (R., p.115.) He specifically argued that trial 
counsel should have based his argument on the fact that Mr. Mallory invoked his right to 
counsel far earlier in the proceedings than the district court apparently concluded. 
(R., pp.115-16 (Mr. Mallory's allegation in post-conviction); Supp. Tr., p.12, L.17-p.121, 
L.20 (the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress).) Trial counsel was unable to 
make an argument about the actual merits of when Mr. Mallory invoked his right as a 
direct result of his failure to file the motion to suppress timely. When a motion to 
suppress is filed untimely, the courts will not consider the merits of the motion unless 
the proponent shows good cause or excusable neglect for the late filing. See, e.g., 
State v. Alanis, 109 Idaho 884, 888 (1985); State v. Dice. 126 Idaho 595, 597 (Ct. App. 
1994 ). "Allowing untimely motions to be heard because they appear meritorious," the 
Dice Court held, "eviscerates the purpose of [I.C.R. 12(d)]." Dice, 126 Idaho at 597. 
Thus, a trial court would abuse its discretion by considering the merits of a pretrial 
motion filed late without justification.2 Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888. 
As such, trial counsel was reduced to arguing that he had just learned of the 19-
second gap, and that the gap must, therefore, be the point ?t which Mr. Mallory 
requested counsel, (see Supp. Tr., p.81, Ls.2-18), since newly-discovered information 
about the exhibit might constitute good cause. However, trial counsel was unsuccessful 
in that effort. (See R., p.177 (district court in post-conviction finding, as a matter of fact, 
1 The reference to the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to the Fifth Amendment, as the 
source of the relevant right to counsel simply appears to be a typographical error. 
2 The State actually contends that the district court ruled on the merits of Mr. Mallory's 
motion, rather than the fact that it was untimely filed. (Resp. Br., p.15.) However, the 
district court actually ruled that the argument about the 19-second gap (i.e., the 
justification for the late filing) did not support the motion to suppress. (Supp. Tr., p.121, 
Ls.13-20; see also R., p.177 (district court in post-conviction finding, as a matter of fact, 
that the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the late filing).) 
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that the motion was late and the trial court did not find good cause to excuse the late 
filing).) That means trial counsel was preciuded from arguing, and the district court was 
precluded from considering or ruling on, the actual merits of the motion to suppress. 
Alanis, 109 Idaho at 888; Dice, 126 Idaho 597. Trial counsel does not perform 
reasonably when he does not timely file valid motions. See, e.g., State v. Porter, 130 
Idaho 772, 794 (1997) ("we note that the failure to file a motion is considered deficient 
performance by counsel if there were a reasonable probability that the motion would 
have been meritorious."). 
To that point, the State does not contest Mr. Mallory's contention that the first 
unequivocal invocation of his right to counsel occurred at 1: 15:30 in the interview. ( See 
Resp. Br., p.19 (the State's only reference to that fact providing: "Even if Mallory's first 
reference to a lawyer, which occurred at approximately 01: 15:34, is considered an 
unambiguous invocation, by that time Mallory already made statements about his 
whereabouts the prior evening, including the last time he allegedly saw Charlene.").)3 
However, the prosecutor below represented that Mr. Mallory did not invoke his right to 
counsel until 1 :34:32. (Supp. Tr., p.110, Ls.20-23.) The district court apparently 
accepted the prosecutor's representation. (See Supp. Tr., p.120, L. 17 - p.121, L.20.) 
Since Mr. Mallory made an unequivocal request for counsel well before that time, a 
properly presented motion to suppress (which would include ensuring the district court 
3 The State's reference to the fact about when Mr. Mallory made his request for counsel 
was made in the context of an argument that the portions of the video prior to that 
moment might still be admissible. (See Resp. Br., p.19.) This Court does not have to 
decide that issue, as there are several other reasons the remaining portion of the video 
might be inadmissible. That is an issue for remand; the issue on appeal is whether the 
trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not properly arguing to suppress the vast 
majority of statements which came after Mr. Mallory's unequivocal request for counsel 
was not scrupulously honored by officers. 
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the video which proves Mr. Mallory's argument correct) a 
being 
The timeliness of the motion a critical fact to be considered in post-
conviction, since the untimeliness prevented an argument on the actual merits of the 
motion, and it was the failure to pursue the motion on the actual merits that constitutes 
the claim of ineffective assistance. As such, the State's assertion on appeal - that the 
timeliness of the motion to suppress is not relevant (Resp. Br., p.15) - is erroneous. 
B. There Was No Strategic Rationale Behind Trial Counsel's Failure To File A 
Timely Motion, And So, Mr. Mallory Has Proved Deficient Performance 
This also demonstrates the error in the State's assertion that there was some 
strategic or tactical reason for trial counsel's actions vis-a-vis the motion to suppress 
Mr. Mallory's statements. The motion trial counsel filed requested the district court 
suppress all the statements Mr. Mallory made during the interview. (Supp. R., p.254.) 
There is no strategic reason for counsel to preclude himself from making the stronger 
argument so that he might resort to making a weaker argument, and in doing so, force 
himself to overcome an additional procedural hurdle. Furthermore, the fact that trial 
counsel moved to suppress all Mr. Mallory's statements disproves the State's claim that 
he might have had a tactical reason for letting in some of Mr. Mallory's statements, such 
that Mr. Mallory would not have to testify. (See Resp. Br., p.20 n.6.) Thus, the State's 
arguments regarding the deficient performance prong of the Fifth Amendment claim is 
meritless; Mr. Mallory proved that point by a preponderance of the evidence. 
7 
Since A Properly-Argued Motion To Suppress Was Meritorious, Mr. Mallory Has 
Also Proved Prejudice 
is so 
from the fact that a timely motion suppress that evidence would have been 
granted. This is true regardless of the other evidence presented at trial. (See Resp. 
Br., pp.16-19 (arguing that since there was other evidence of guilt the failure to file the 
motion to suppress was not prejudicial) ) As the Court of Appeals explained in 
Hernandez, because the evidence in question "should have been suppressed had a 
timely motion to suppress been filed by defense counsel, we find that Hernandez has 
demonstrated that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's judicially determined 
ineffective assistance. Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 358 (Ct. App. 1998). Thus, 
the prejudice - the reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different 
had the jury not been presented with inadmissible evidence - is self-evident in these 
cases. See id.; see also Hoffman v. State. 153 Idaho 898, 905 (Ct. App. 2012) ("Based 
upon this record, a motion to suppress may well have succeed and altered the outcome 
of Hoffman's case.") (capitalization altered). After all, the likely outcome of the motion is 
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland4 test. See, e.g., State v. Payne, 
146 Idaho 548, 562 (2008) (applying this rule when the motion was unlikely to have 
been granted on its merits). 
The prejudice is particularly evident in cases such as this, where the State's case 
is entirely circumstantial and the credibility of the defense's alternate theory of the case 
is at issue. Here, the apparent inconsistency between Mr. Mallory's improperly-
admitted statements and other of the defense's evidence was used to help discredit the 
4 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). 
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defense's theory of the case. (Supp. Tr, p.1300, L.21 - p.1301, L 14.) Had the jury not 
seen that evidence, as in Hernandez, confidence in the jury's verdict is undermined and 
there is a reasonable possibility that the outcome would have been different. That this 
point was not argued strenuously by the prosecutor (see Resp. Br., pp.19-20) is 
irrelevant The fact that the point was argued, and so, the jury could follow that 
argument and discard otherwise-reasonable doubts as a result, shows the reasonable 
possibility of a different outcome, had the evidence supporting that argument not been 
presented. Thus, Mr. Mallory proved there is a reasonable possibility of a different 
result As such, he proved the prejudice prong of his Fifth Amendment claim. 
Since Mr. Mallory proved both deficient performance and prejudice by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the district court erred in denying his Fifth Amendment 
claim for post-conviction relief. As such, this Court should reverse the judgment and 
remand this case for an order granting post-conviction relief on this claim. 
11. 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That His 
Constitutional Rights To Due Process And Equal Protection Were Violated When The 
District Court Failed To Timely Rule On His Motion To Appoint A Private Investigator 
The State concedes error on the private investigator claim recognizing that the 
district court summarily dismissed the claim on a ground for which Mr. Mallory did not 
receive the statutorily-required notice and opportunity to respond. (Resp. Br., p.24 
("Mallory is correct in his assertion that he was entitled to additional notice from the 
court when it decided to dismiss Claim V on a ground other than that asserted by the 
state.").) As such, this case should be remanded so that Mr. Mallory might receive the 
9 
which he is entitled See L § 19-4906(b) (setting forth required 
This Court Should Not Affirm The Order For Summary Dismissal Of The Private 
Investigator Claim In Absence Of Adequate Notice And Opportunity To Respond 
Despite its concession, the State argues that this Court can nevertheless affirm 
the order summarily dismissing this claim despite the lack of statutorily-required notice if 
this Court, looking only at the appellate record, determines this claim is not justiciable in 
post-conviction. (Resp. Br., p.24.) That argument is meritless for two reasons: the 
appellate court is not the proper forum to address that issue for the first time, and even 
if this Court does reach that issue, Mr. Mallory's claim is justiciable in post-conviction. 
1 The Question Of Justiciability Of A Claim In Post-Conviction Is Not 
Properly Resolved For The First Time On Appeal 
The notice requirement, both in its express statutory context, as well as it more 
general constitutional setting, requires not just that the petitioner be put on notice, but 
that he also have an opportunity to be heard in response to that notice. See I.C. §19-
4906(b). Because of this requirement for an opportunity to respond, the Court of 
Appeals has refused to consider issues like this for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., 
Caldwell v. State, _ P.3d _, 2015 WL 4770639, *4 (Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2015) (pet. 
review filed); Wagner v. State, 158 Idaho 582, 585 (Ct. App. 2015) In Caldwell, for 
example, the petitioner claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to interview and 
call an expert witness. Id. The State conceded the merits of that claim, but argued that 
the Court of Appeals could affirm the order of summary dismissal because the petitioner 
had not presented admissible evidence establishing the substance of the witness's 
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proposed testimony. Id. The Caldwell Court rejected the State's argument, holding that 
affirming an order of summary dismissal on a basis the petitioner did not have notice 
and an opportunity to respond would be tantamount to a violation of I.C. § 19-4906(b). 
Id. at *5. Thus, it is improper for the appellate court to address the issue for the first 
time on appeaL Id.; cf Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585. 
Per the statute, Mr. Mallory has the right to an opportunity to amend or 
supplement his petition with evidence and/or argument demonstrating that his claim is 
justiciable in post-conviction. See I. C. § 19-4906(b ). However, the appellate courts' 
review is limited to the evidence, theories, and arguments presented below. See, e.g., 
State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 670 (2010). Therefore, it would be difficult and 
improper for the appellate court to try to accommodate the requisite opportunity to 
amend or supplement the petition with new evidence and argument to address the 
alleged deficiency therein. Therefore, as in Caldwell and Wagner, this Court should 
reject the State's invitation to affirm the summary dismissal on a ground for which 
Mr. Mallory has not had the requisite notice or the opportunity to respond. Rather, it 
should reverse the summary dismissal order and remand this case so that Mr. Mallory 
has the required opportunity to present his supplemented claim to the district court. 
Compare Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585. 
2. The Private Investigator Claim Is Justiciable Because It Could Not Have 
Been Raised On Direct Appeal In An Exercise Of Due Diligence 
The post-conviction statutes expressly provide that a claim of constitutional error, 
such as the one Mr. Mallory has raised in the private investigator claim, is justiciable in 
post-conviction, provided it could not have been raised earlier in an exercise of due 
11 
. § 19-1401, see also DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 603-04 (2009) 
that allegations 
, Rossignol v. 152 Idaho 700, 706 
are separately cognizable in post-
App. 12) (same). such, 
private investigator claim, alleging a due process violation, is cognizable in post-
conviction, provided appellate counsel could not have, in an exercise of due diligence, 
raised the issue on direct appeal. 
However, an answer to that question is not actually necessary to this case 
because Mr. Mallory also alleged that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising 
that issue on direct appeal. ( See R., p.113 ( claim "d"); see also App. Br., pp.29-31 
(arguing the impact of the district court's determination that appellate counsel was not 
ineffective for not raising this and other issues on direct appeal).) This means that, if 
this Court determines that this cognizable claim should have been raised on direct 
appeal, the district court erred by summarily dismissing claim "d." However, if this Court 
determines, as did the district court, this cognizable claim could not have been raised on 
direct appeal in an exercise of due diligence, the district court erred by summarily 
dismissing claim "v." Either way, Mr. Mallory is entitled to relief in this appeal. 
This also means that the State's contention - that since the letter from appellate 
counsel does not specifically mention the private investigator claim, Mr. Mallory has 
failed to show the issue could not have been raised in an exercise of due diligence 
(Resp. Br., p.25.) - is irrelevant. The district court actually determined that appellate 
counsel was not ineffective for deciding not to raise this, as well as other 
claims, because they were not adequately preserved for appeal at the trial level. 
(R., pp.174-77.) That conclusion answers the critical question on this issue: the private 
12 
investigator claim could not be raised on direct appeal in an exercise of due diligence. 
( See R., pp.174-77.) The State has not argued that this conclusion was erroneous. 
(See generally Resp. Br.) That means, regardless of what information he actually gave 
to Mr. Mallory in that regard, appellate counsel could not have raised this issue in an 
exercise of due diligence. 5 Therefore, even if this Court decides to address this issue 
for the first time on appeal, Mr. Mallory has presented sufficient evidence to survive 
summary dismissal on the private investigator claim. 
B. Mr. Mallory Is Not Required To Allege Actual Prejudice For Post-Conviction 
Claims Alleging A Violation Of His Constitutional Rights; The State Bears The 
Burden To Prove Harmlessness On Such Claims 
Even though this issue should be remanded because Mr. Mallory was not 
provided the requisite notice, this Court should address and reject the State's prejudice 
argument on the private investigator claim so that the district court might not err on 
remand. See State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 113 (2005) (reaffirming that the 
appellate court has authority to decide additional issues to guide the district court on 
remand). Specifically, the State contends that summary dismissal was appropriate 
5 Mr. Mallory maintains, as discussed in depth in the Appellant's Brief at pages 30 and 
35-36, that appellate counsel's explanation of why he did not raise issues surrounding 
the district court's decision to deny Mr. Mallory's motion for continuance so that he 
might locate the potential witness and potential suspect Wes Hardy encompasses the 
claim regarding his request for a private investigator. The harm alleged in the private 
investigator claim was the reason he had to ask for a continuance: he was unable to 
access evidence critical to his defense - namely, Wes Hardy's statements - because of 
the erroneous rulings on his motions. (See R., pp.114-15 (Mr. Mallory alleging facts in 
his affidavit demonstrating trial counsel's inability to gather information from Wes 
Hardy); R., p.62 (affidavit of trial counsel explaining he needed an investigator to gather 
that sort of information) (Supp. Tr., p.47, Ls.4-17 (motion for continuance because of an 
inability to locate Wes Hardy).) As such, appellate counsel's letter explaining why he 
did not raise that issue reinforces the district court's conclusion that appellate counsel 
could not have, in an exercise of due diligence, raised the private investigator claim on 
direct appeal. 
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because Mr. Mallory did not allege facts establishing actual prejudice on the private 
investigator claim. (Resp. Br., p.26.) That argument is meritless. The Idaho Supreme 
Court's decision in DeRushe and the Court of Appeals' decision in Rossignol make it 
eminently clear that, if the petitioner chooses to frame a post-conviction claim as 
alleging a violation of his constitutional rights, he need only allege facts showing the 
violation of that right. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04; Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 704. 
Once he does so, the burden shifts, and the State must prove that error harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Rossignol, 152 Idaho at 703-04. The State's argument on 
appeal is based on an attempt to shoehorn this issue under the standards for ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims, an argument which the appellate courts have already 
rejected. See id.; DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603-04. Therefore, whether or not 
Mr. Mallory alleged actual prejudice is irrelevant; the State, not Mr. Mallory, bears the 
burden of alleging and presenting facts to prove the violation of his constitutional right to 
due process harmless at an evidentiary hearing.6 
As a result of the State's concession regarding the lack of adequate notice, this 
Court should reverse the order summarily denying the private investigator claim and 
remand for further proceedings, particularly since Mr. Mallory's allegations on that claim 
raise a genuine issue of material fact as to a violation of his constitutional right to due 
process. 
6 An evidentiary hearing is merited on the private investigator claim because 
Mr. Mallory's allegations about the violation of his right to an investigator to help him 
gather the raw materials of his defense raise a genuine issue of material fact which, if 
resolved in his favor, would entitle him to relief. (See App. Br., pp.31-35.) 
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111 
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed Mr. Mallory's Claim That Trial 
Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To "Fully Litigate" A Challenge To Evidence And 
Testimony Regarding The Nature Of The Scratch Marks On His Person 
A. The Fact That Mr. Mallory Alleged Counsel Had Not "Fully Litigated" The Scratch 
Mark Evidence Is Not A Valid Basis For Affirming The Order Of Summary 
Dismissal 
The State does not contest Mr. Mallory's assertion regarding the facts at the 
heart of the scratch mark claim - that the scratch marks on his body were not received 
until after his wife had passed away and that he pointed out evidence supporting that 
assertion to his trial counsel. (See generally Resp. Br) What it does argue is that 
Mr. Mallory's allegations regarding the resulting ineffective assistance counsel that 
trial counsel had not ''fully litigated" that issue - were bare and conclusory, and so, 
summary dismissal was appropriate. (See Resp. Br., p 32 ("[Mr.] Mallory's bare and 
conclusory statements did not create a genuine issue of material fact entitling him to an 
evidentiary hearing.") ) That argument is meritless for several reasons. 
1. Mr. Mallory Was Not Provided Notice Or An Opportunity To Respond To 
The Assertion That He Needed To Specifically Allege What Action Trial 
Counsel Failed To Undertake 
The only reason cited in the State's motion for summary dismissal below in 
regard to the scratch mark claim (addressed together with all the claims that trial 
counsel was ineffective) was: "While Petitioner presents many hypothetical outcomes, 
he fails to provide any factual evidence to support these claims. Further Petitioner fails 
to address why this evidence is not included .... Petitioner alleges [those] claims 
without factual or material support." (R.. pp.107-08.) The State did not argue that 
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Mr. Mallory failed to identify with sufficient specificity what trial counsel could have done 
differently. (See generally R., p.91 (the motion for summary disposition and dismissal); 
R., pp.103-09 (the brief in support of motion for summary disposition and dismissal).) 
Thus, the State is arguing for this Court to affirm the order of summary dismissal on a 
ground for which Mr. Mallory did not have notice, which, as discussed in detail in 
Section II, supra, is inappropriate. 
2. The Allegation That Trial Counsel Failed To "Fully Litigate" The Scratch 
Mark Claim Is Not "Bare And Conclusory" As It Is Supported By 
Admissible Facts In Mr. Mallory's Affidavit 
The State contends the scratch mark claim was properly summarily dismissed 
because "[Mr.] Mallory's bare and conclusory statements did not create a genuine issue 
of material fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing." (See Resp. Br., p.32.) That 
argument mischaracterizes the "bare and conclusory" standard. 
A claim is only "bare and conclusory" if it is "unsubstantiated by any fact" 
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 121 (Ct App. 1997). As such, when the Court of 
Appeals determined that a claim was supported by admissible evidence, it held that 
claim was not "bare and conclusory." Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708, 712 (Ct. App. 
2015). The State has not challenged the facts as alleged by Mr. Mallory in his affidavit: 
that the scratch marks were not received until after his wife had passed away and that 
he pointed out evidence supporting that assertion to his trial counsel. ( See generally 
Resp. Br.) 
And even if the State had contested those facts, this is the summary dismissal 
phase of the proceedings. That means the facts alleged in Mr. Mallory's affidavit are 
presumed to be true and are, by themselves, sufficient to overcome a motion for 
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summary dismissal. Compare Baldwin v State, 145 Idaho 148, 155 (2008) ("Baldwin 
presents his own affidavit describing his version of [events]. Baldwin's affidavit sets 
forth facts that would be admissible at trial. Thus, because Baldwin's Petition and 
Affidavit present facts that would entitle Baldwin to relief, if he were able to prove them 
at a hearing, the district court erred when it summarily dismissed the petition."). 
Therefore, as there was admissible evidence supporting the allegation in the scratch 
mark claim, the State's argument that it is bare and conclusory must fail. 
3. The Allegation That Trial Counsel Did Not "Fully Litigate" The Scratch 
Mark Claim Is Sufficiently Specific To Survive Summary Dismissal 
The allegation that the scratch mark claim was not "fully litigated" is sufficiently 
specific to survive summary dismissal. The State's argument fails to appreciate the 
different levels of proof that exist at the various stages of post-conviction proceedings. 
While a petitioner must ultimately prove by a preponderance of the evidence how 
counsel erred and how that error prejudiced him, that is the standard at the evidentiary 
hearing phase. See Loveland v. State, 141 Idaho 933. 936 (Ct. App. 2005) ("At the 
evidentiary hearing, Loveland was required to prove his claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence, and the standard for avoiding summary 
dismissal ... was no longer applicable."). The standard at the summary dismissal 
stage is lower. See id. A claim is supposed to survive summary dismissal if it presents 
a genuine issue of material fact - i.e., if it sets forth a claim which, if the petitioner is 
ultimately able to prove at the hearing, would entitle him to relief. See Charboneau v. 
State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). 
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As such, a claim does not need to have all the minute details in place to survive 
summary dismissal; it must simply present evidence which creates a genuine issue of 
material fact. See State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008); see also LC. § 19-
4903 (a petition for post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to the facts within 
the personal knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence 
supporting its allegations must be attached, or an explanation of why that is not done 
must be submitted). For ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the petitioner 
therefore needs to allege deficient performance and support that allegation with specific 
facts. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. Whether those specific facts are material "is 
determined by its [the fact's] relationship to the legal theories presented by the parties." 
Id In cases where "such a factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be 
conducted." Id. 
Mr. Mallory's allegation on the scratch mark issue satisfies the standard set forth 
in Yakovac. His legal theory is that his attorney did not take all the steps a reasonable 
attorney would have to address the scratch mark evidence the State was going to 
present (R., p.116) (alleging that evidence "would have contradicted the state's theory 
that petitioner had mark's [sic] on his body before the interview that were the result of a 
struggle with the victim.").) In his affidavit, he alleged two relevant facts: that the 
scratch marks on his body were not received until after his wife had passed away and 
that he pointed out evidence supporting that assertion to his trial counsel. (R., p.160.) 
Those consequential facts have a logical connection with his legal theory. Therefore, 
they give rise to a genuine issue of material fact: if he is correct, and the scratch marks 
were not present until after his wife had passed away, and his counsel did not take the 
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steps a reasonable attorney would to address that evidence, he would be entitled to 
relief. Therefore, even though he did not specifically identify the precise action or 
actions trial counsel should have taken. he still alleged a genuine issue of material fact, 
as required by Yakovac, which means summary dismissal of this claim is not 
appropriate. 
B. The District Court Assessed The Prejudice Arguments On The Scratch Mark 
Claim Under An Erroneously-High Standard; Under The Proper Standard, 
Mr. Mallory Sufficiently Alleged Prejudice To Survive Summary Dismissal 
Along those same lines, the State contends that Mr. Mallory made bare and 
conclusory allegations in regard to the prejudice caused by counsel's failure to properly 
and fully challenge the scratch mark evidence. (Resp. Br., p.32.) However, the State 
misses the more fundamental point as it does not respond to Mr. Mallory's contention 
that the district court applied an erroneously-high standard to its analysis of the 
prejudice issue in the summary dismissal phase. (See generally Resp. Br.) The issue 
of whether there is sufficient allegation of prejudice should first be addressed by the 
district court under the proper standard rather than this Court considering the issue for 
the first time on appeal. Compare Wagner, 158 Idaho at 585. As such, the order for 
summary dismissal of the scratch mark claim should be vacated and that issue 
remanded at least so the district court can consider the prejudice arguments under the 
proper standard. (See App. Br., pp.37-39 (discussing the proper standard for prejudice 
as it relates to the scratch mark issue).) 
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At any rate, there were facts before the district court which showed prejudice.7 In 
Mallory asserted the marks on body were not caused 
(R., 1 was trying to present an alternate perpetrator 
defense, which necessarily meant he was arguing he was not present or involved at the 
critical time. (See, e.g., R., p.113.) However, the State, through its witness, Officer 
Ward, used the scratch marks to put Mr. Mallory at the scene as evidence he and his 
wife were in domestic-violence-type struggle at the critical time. (See Supp. Tr., p.631, 
L23 - p.632, L.20.) This is a particularly important fact given the State's case was 
entirely circumstantial. Thus, the scratch mark evidence played an important role in 
tying the State's case together and discrediting the defense theory. Had that evidence 
been properly challenged, the confidence in the verdict is undermined - there is a 
reasonable possibility the jury would not have convicted Mr. Mallory without that 
evidence placing him at the scene at the critical time. Thus, Mr. Mallory has made a 
sufficient showing of prejudice to survive summary dismissal, particularly because at 
7 The State contends that facts must be alleged within the context of a particular claim 
and cannot be cross-applied to other claims. ( See Resp. Br., pp.26-27 ("Mallory 
attempts to remedy the deficiencies in his allegations in support of Claim V by relying on 
allegations he made in support of other claims in his petition .... he cannot use those 
claims, which were dismissed, to show he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on 
Claim V.") This argument is frivolous, as the practical result would only serve to waste 
judicial resources. The State's argument might initially make more sense in the post-
conviction context, where a petitioner is allowed to allege facts within the petition itself. 
See, e.g., Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding that, when a 
petitioner verifies his petition, it has the effect of an affidavit vis-a-vis the facts discussed 
therein). However, the State's argument fails to appreciate the distinction between facts 
and legal arguments in the post-conviction context. See Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444. 
As Yakovac explained, the petitioner alleges facts which must then connect to the legal 
theories. Id. Thus, while a particular legal theory might be dismissed because the facts 
do not connect to that theory such that they would create a genuine issue of material 
fact, the facts themselves remain intact and can impact on other valid claims. Id. Thus, 
the State's contention that Mr. Mallory cannot cross-apply the facts between his various 
claims is meritless and should be rejected. 
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this stage in the proceedings, the inferences are supposed to be liberally construed in 
his favor as he is the non-moving party. See, e.g., Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792. 
Since Mr. Mallory made sufficient allegations and presented sufficient evidence 
to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the scratch mark claim, this Court should 
reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing that claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mallory respectfully requests that this Court reverse the orders denying and 
summarily dismissing his claims for post-conviction relief and remand this case for 
further proceedings. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 2015. 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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